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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law: Eavesdropping Statute
Held Violative of Fourth Amendment
Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to bribe a New York
state official. The conviction was based upon evidence obtained
pursuant to a New York statute' permitting the use of electronic
eavesdropping equipment.2 Petitioner appealed on the grounds
that the statute authorized trespassory invasion into a constitu-
tionally protected area, allowed general searches for mere evi-
dence, and violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
3
Reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the United States
Supreme Court held the statute to be unconstitutional as it did
not meet the requirements of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
The problem of electronic search and seizure4 first came be-
fore the Supreme Court5 in Olmstead v. United States,6 where
1. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (1957).
2. There were three different "bugs" used in compiling evidence
in this case. The first was used to record a conversation between
one Pansini and an employee of the state liquor authority. With his
consent, a device was placed on Pansini for use during a meeting relating
to obtaining a liquor license. This conversation led police to seek an
order authorizing the "bugging" of an attorney's office. Information
from this second device led to another man, Harry Steiman. An order
was obtained to plant a device in Steiman's office and it was there that
the police found evidence of Berger's role as a "go-between." Berger's
standing to object to these orders was assumed by the majority. See
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
3. The Court found it unnecessary to specifically discuss peti-
tioner's mere evidence and fifth amendment claims because of its ruling
on the fourth amendment issue. However, the Court did mention that
petitioner's argument concerning mere evidence had been invalidated by
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Hayden Court held that
the mere evidence rule, established in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921), was no longer valid, since the principal object of the fourth
amendment was the protection of privacy rather than property.
4. "Wiretapping" is the interception of both sides of a telephone
conversation by the use of equipment which is connected to the wires
carrying the communication. "Bugging" is the placing of a listening
device so as to overhear what is taking place in a particular location.
The "bugged informer" describes the practice of providing a party
aiding the police with a device which allows conversations to be over-
heard or recorded by the police. For the purposes of this discussion
the term "electronic search and seizure" refers to any use of such
devices by the police.
5. State court decisions prior to Supreme Court cases in this area
did not involve questions of validity of search and seizure but rather of
accuracy of reports, intelligibility of what was heard, and identification
of voices. See, e.g., State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144
N.W. 417 (1913); State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885 (1926).
Fourth amendment questions were not involved as the majority of
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the Court sustained convictions based on evidence obtained by
"tapping" defendants' telephone conversations. 7 In so doing, the
Court established two general principles concerning electronic
search and seizure. Ruling that the words of the amendment
must be read in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search at the time of the amendment's adoption s and though
such language was to be liberally construed, 9 it could not be ex-
tended beyond the obviously tangible nature of the items listed
therein, 0 the Olmstead Court held that conversations were not
within the "persons or things" protected by the fourth amend-
ment.1 The Court further ruled that, even if conversations
were protected, no trespass had taken place and no unreasonable
search had been conducted since under the terms of the fourth
amendment a wiretap did not constitute an entry into the houses
or offices of the defendants.
The Court in Olmstead also stated that if Congress desired
to protect the secrecy of telephone communications, it could
states had rejected the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and were still operating under the common-
law rule that relevant evidence was admissible no matter how obtained.
6. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7. The defendants in Olmstead argued that this evidence should
have been excluded either because the "tapping" was contrary to a
Washington statute, REMINGTON'S COCMP. STAT. ch. 2656, § 18 (1922), or
in the alternative, because it constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure. After ruling that conversation was not protected by the fourth
amendment the Court stated that the statutory violation was unimpor-
tant as the federal exclusionary rule applied only to constitutional
violations. 277 U.S. at 467.
8. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
9. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Ex parte Lange, 18 U.S. (Wall)
163, 178 (1873).
10. Four Justices dissented in the Olmstead decision. Justice
Holmes was not prepared to hold the fourth amendment applicable to
conversations, but felt that evidence seized by a wiretap should have
been excluded, seemingly by the Supreme Court's supervisory powers.
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justices Stone and Butler, would have held
that conversations were protected. These Justices based their opinions
upon Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where it was
said: "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the inva-
sion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property ......
11. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNST.
amend. IV.
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pass a rule of evidence prohibiting the introduction of wiretap
evidence.12 In 1934 Congress responded to this invitation 8 by
passing a statute prohibiting the unauthorized interception and
divulgence of communications. 4 Although the Supreme Court
has subsequently applied this Act to the federal government, 5
encompassing both interstate and intrastate communications, 6
the scope of protection that this statute affords is somewhat
limited. For example, the Court has interpreted the "communi-
cations" protected by the Act to include only the means of trans-
mitting a conversation. Therefore, an officer may eavesdrop on
a conversation or listen to one end of a telephone conversation
so long as he does not actually tap the telephone lines.'7 In
addition, either party to a communication may authorize a third
person to listen in.'8 Furthermore, since the statute is only a
rule of evidence, the Court has refused to extend its application
to the states.19
Notwithstanding the Act's inherent infirmities, the Court
has allowed additional judicial emasculation of the statute as a
protection against eavesdropping. While the doctrine of the
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
13. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Act did
not specifically say such evidence could not be used in court, but the
Court considered the relating of a communication in court as a "divul-
gence" within the meaning of the Act. See also McGuire v. Amrein,
101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951).
14. ".... [N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communica-
tions to any person ... ." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
15. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Although the
government had argued that Congress had not intended that the federal
government should fall within this ban, the Court ruled that "any
person" comprehends federal agents as well as other persons.
16. Since the same lines were used to carry interstate and intra-
state messages and a "tapper" could not discriminate between the two,
the statute must protect both in order to protect interstate communica-
ions. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). See also United
States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956); Sablowsky v. United
States, 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938); Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687
(1st Cir. 1938); Craska v. New York Tel. Co., 239 F. Supp. 932 (N.D.
N.Y. 1965); United States v. Lipinski, 151 F. Supp. 145 (D.N.M. 1957).
17. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942).
18. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). See also United
States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Pierce,
124 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ohio 1954), affd, 224 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1955).
19. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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"fruit of the poisonous tree"20 has been applied to this eviden-
tiary rule,21 the testimony of a party to an intercepted telephone
conversation-induced to testify as to other matters by a federal
agent's knowledge of that conversation-is still admissible so
long as neither the intercepted conversation nor any informa-
tion contained therein is introduced at the trial. 22 Further, since
the statute forbids the interception and divulgence of communi-
cations, it is the opinion of the Department of Justice that both
these elements are necessary to constitute a violation.23 The
Justice Department has also taken the position that "divulgence"
does not mean the reporting of a communication within the De-
partment.24 Although the Supreme Court has not decided this
question, lower courts have reached opposite conclusions.25
These administrative interpretations and the Supreme Court's
decisions limiting the applicability of the statute make it clear
that telephone users are not completely protected from the
20. This doctrine was established in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), where the Court held that evidence
which was discovered as a result of information obtained from an illegal
search was inadmissible-unless the evidence would have been reason-
ably discovered in another way.
21. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. United States v. Goldstein, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). This case is
factually similar to that of Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
In Weiss, however, the government not only used the conversations to
induce witnesses to testify but also introduced the conversations as evi-
dence at the trial. This latter use resulted in a reversal of the convic-
tions. The government had argued that these communications were
being divulged with "permission of the sender;" but the Court held that
"permission" did not mean "authorization consisting of the agreement
to turn state's evidence, by some of the defendants after they had been
apprised of the knowledge of their communications by Government's
representatives, and in the hope of leniency .... " Weiss v. United
States, supra at 330.
23. This proposition was first advanced by Attorney General Jack-
son in 1941. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941).
This question has not been decided by the Supreme Court. In fact,
recent cases have specifically left the question open. See Benanti v.
United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107
(1957).
24. Attorney General Biddle stated that to prohibit divulgence
was not to prohibit an agent from reporting to his superiors. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1941, at 4, col. 2.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C.
1950) (dicta supporting the government's position), rev'd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Contra, United States v. Cop-
lon, 88 F. Supp. 921, 925 (S.D.N.Y.), T'ev'd and remanded, 185 F.2d 629,
636 (2d Cir. 1950).
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threat of governmental wiretapping.26
The principles established in Olmstead were also applied to
the first "bugging" case2 to reach the Supreme Court. In
Goldman v. United States,28 the majority affirmed a conviction
obtained through evidence "seized" by federal agents using a
listening device placed against the outside of defendants' wall.
The Court found Olmstead to be indistinguishable and reaf-
firmed the principles established therein.
However, a substantial change in the Court's approach to
bugging was initiated in Silverman v. United States.29 The
Court rejected communicative evidence which had been seized
by the use of a "spike" microphone inserted into defendants'
wall. The listening apparatus had been inserted so that the
point came to rest against a heating duct thereby causing the
duct to act as a giant microphone extending throughout the
the house. The Court held that this invasion of a part of the
premises occupied by the defendants was a trespass.30 Since the
trespass was an unreasonable governmental intrusion into the
constitutionally protected area of the home, the Court found it
unnecessary to consider the viability of Olmstead's conclusion
that mere words were outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment. Moreover, in Wong Sun v. United States,3 1 decided two
years after Silverman, the Court stated that it "followed" from
the holding in Silverman that the fourth amendment protects
against the overhearing of verbal statements incident to a tres-
pass.82 These decisions indicate that while conversation is now
to be included within the fourth amendment protections, some
actual trespass must occur before eavesdropping becomes an un-
26. By order of President Johnson federal agents may wiretap in
those cases in which the national security is threatened. N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1965, at 6, col. 3. Inasmuch as this is only an administrative
decision it is subject to change.
27. For the distinction between a "wiretap" and a "bug," see
note 4 supra.
28. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
30. Id. at 510.
31. 371U.S. 471 (1963).
32. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). This
case, though concerned with statements overheard by federal agents, is
not one involving electronic search and seizure. The statements were
made by one James Toy upon his arrest at his home. The Court, quot-
ing ,Silverman as holding that verbal statements are protected from
illegal seizure, as are the traditional "papers and effects," held that
these statements were the "fruits" of an arrest made without probable
cause.
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constitutional activity. 3
Despite this recognition of the applicability of the fourth
amendment, the Court has upheld the use of electronic devices
where a supposed accomplice or co-conspirator has hidden a
microphone on his person in order that the incriminating con-
versation might be recorded or overheard by the police.3 4 Justi-
fication for this action lies in the rationale that a report of the
conversation could have been given by the cooperating party
whether or not the conversation was recorded. 35 The electronic
device is therefore used to provide an additional witness to the
conversation or to aid the testifying party's memory. In either
case it is merely a method of establishing the truth of the witness'
report of the conversation. Strictly speaking, this use of elec-
tronic devices is not eavesdropping as there is arguably no sur-
reptitious overhearing of a conversation that could not other-
wise have been heard.36
While the Supreme Court was gradually developing the con-
stitutional law applicable to electronic eavesdropping, several
states enacted regulatory statutes.37 Once the Court determined
33. The trespass that is required need only be very slight. While
the government in Silverman argued that insertion of a spike into a
party wall was not a trespass under local law, the Court said that the
decision should not turn upon "the technicality of a trespass upon a
party wall as a matter of local law, but is based upon the reality of an
actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
34. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (supposed
co-conspirator); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (recording
of bribe attempt of a revenue agent).
35. See, e.g., Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1283, 1289 (1964).
36. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); United States v.
Pullings, 321 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Vittoria, 284
F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. Albert, 182 Cal. App. 2d 729, 6
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1960).
37. Thirty-six states have statutes which in some form protect the
individual from the use of electronic devices. Illinois is the only state
which prohibits bugging and wiretapping by both government officials
and private individuals. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14.1-.3, ch. 134, § 16
(1964).
Six other states also forbid all types of electronic eavesdropping:
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 640, 653h-j (West Supp. 1965); N. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 125A, art. 35, §§ 92, 93 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 99
(Supp. 1966); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.620, .630, .650 (1963); N.Y. PEN.
LAw § 738 (Supp. 1966); OaR. REv. STA T. § 165.540(1) (1963). How-
ever, each of these states permits some sort of official electronic search
and seizure. The California "anti-bugging" statute allows the police to
obtain permission from their superiors or the local district attorney to
conduct an eavesdropping operation. I, addition, California's wiretap
ban, though setting up no procedures, extends only to unauthorized wire-
tapping, seemingly leaving the way open for some sort of authoriza-
[Vol. 52:541
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that conversation was protected by the fourth amendment, the
exclusionary rule established by Mapp v. Ohio3s required that
these statutes satisfy federal search and seizure standards3 9 in
order for evidence obtained under them to be admissible in
court.
40
The federal standards for the issuance of search warrants
are based on the fourth amendment's conditions: "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Statutes41 and court
tion. The remaining five states with "total bans" have set up specific
procedures by which the police can obtain a court order to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance; MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94 (1957); MASS. ANx
LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1966); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.660 (1957);
N.Y. CODE CIUM. PROC. § 813-a (1957); ORE. REV. STAT. § 141.720 (1963).
Twenty-nine states prohibit only wiretapping; however, all but
twelve of these have statutory language which would permit official
"taps": ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 414 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.030 (1962);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-4-17 (1963); CON. GEE'E. STAT. REV. § 53-140
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 559 (Supp. 1966); HAWAiI REV. LAWS
§ 309A-1 (Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-12-1 (1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-155 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958); R.I. GEN.
LAWs ANN. § 11-35-12 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2117 (1955);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-48-11 (1953). The Florida Supreme Court has
decided that its statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 822.10 (1965), was not
meant to include the police. Williams v. State, 109 So. 2d 379 (Fla.
1959). The Louisiana statute specifically exempts the police. LA.
REv. STAT. § 14:322 (1950). The fifteen remaining states with wiretap
bans have not set up any procedures by which the police may conduct
wiretaps, but all the statutes contain wording which would seemingly
grant police wiretap privileges. The statutes refer to wiretaps which are,
e.g., "unauthorized," "without legal authority," or "willful and mali-
cious": ARx. STAT. ANN. § 73-1810 (1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6704,
6705 (1947); IOWA CODE § 716.8 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 433.430
(1963); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.808 (1954); MoNr. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-
3203 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-328 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:146-1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-05 (1967); OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 4931.28 (1954); S.D. CODE § 13.4519 (1939); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-156 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. § 134.39 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 37-259 (1957).
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The requirements of the fourth amend-
ment were held applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
39. Two years after the Mapp decision, the Court held that the
states must apply federal standards in the area of search and seizure.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The Silverman decision was
applied to the states in Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
40. The federal government has attempted to use wiretap evidence
seized under state law in federal court. This practice was struck down
in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). The Court held that
wiretap evidence was inadmissible in federal court no matter under
what authority seized.
41. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1964) (persons authorized to serve
19671
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rulings have added specificity to these general requirements for
the issuance, execution, and operation of search warrants. The
basic prerequisites for the issuance of a search warrant require
that there be a showing of facts upon which a reasonable and
prudent man would be led to believe that there had been a com-
mission of the crime charged,42 that the warrant must be issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate,43 and that the warrant is
to specify the items to be seized so tat the executing officer will
have nothing left to his discretion. 44 Further, the execution of a
warrant must be in exact accordance with its terms; only those
items specified may be seized.45 Finally, a search warrant au-
thorizes only a single search4 6 and that search must come to an
end when the items called for are found.4 7
warrant); FED. R. Cnuvn. P. 41(b) (grounds for warrant issuance); Mhn.
STAT. § 626.03 (1947) (to whom directed and contents); N.Y. CoDE
CRnM. PRoc. § 801 (1957) (service at night).
42. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Dumbra v. United States,
268 U.S. 435 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878); United States
v. Sebo, 101 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1939); State v. Yet Ning Yee, 145 Cal.
App. 513, 302 P.2d 616 (1956).
43. That the amendment so requires was established in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
106 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); United States v.
Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949).
44. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195
(1927).
45. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498
(1925); United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Brooks
v. State, 235 Md. 23, 200 A.2d 177 (1964); Wacksman v. Harrell, 174
Ohio St. 338, 189 N.E.2d 146 (1963). But see Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947), where the Court said that there is nothing in the
fourth amendment which inhibits the seizure by law enforcement offi-
cers of "contraband," i.e., fruits and instrumentalities of crime or prop-
erty the possession of which is a crime, even though the presence of
such property was not known when the search was initiated, so long as
the officers are validly on the premises.
46. State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963); McDaniel v.
State, 197 Ind. 179, 150 N.E. 50 (1926); Coburn v. State, 78 Okla. Crim.
362, 148 P.2d 483 (1944); Duncan v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 217, 144 P. 629
(1914); Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 644, 153 N.W. 888 (1915); McDonald
v. State, 195 Tenn. 282, 259 S.W.2d 524 (1953); McNear v. Rhay, 398
P.2d 732 (Wash. 1965); State v. Moran, 103 W. Va. 753, 138 S.E. 366
(1927).
47. This requirement follows logically from the rule that only
items described in the warrant may be seized. To hold otherwise would
permit a police officer, after finding the desired items, to conduct a
general search. The fourth amendment was specifically designed to
prohibit general warrants. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481
(1965).
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The instant case is the first in which the Supreme Court has
examined the constitutionality, under the fourth amendment, of
a state's attempt to authorize trespassory electronic search and
seizure.48  The New York statute authorizes the issuance by a
judge of an ex parte order for eavesdropping upon the oath of a
district attorney, or police officer above the rank of sergeant,
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of
crime may be obtained by such eavesdropping. The person or
persons affected by the surveillance must be named, and the
order is effective for no more than two months. However, it
may be renewed by the judge who originally signed it if he deter-
mines that such renewal is in the public interest.49
Reaffirming the proposition that the fourth amendment ap-
plies to conversation, the Berger Court held the statute uncon-
stitutional. Even though it recognized that the New York stat-
ute demanded a showing of probable cause 50 and interposed an
issuing magistrate between the people and the police, the Court
held that the statute in authorizing the ex parte order did not
comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
The requirement of specificity of the warrant was deemed
not to be met in that eavesdropping was authorized without
specifying the crime which had been or was being committed,
the "place to be searched," or the "things to be seized." More-
over, the statute did not require that the eavesdropping cease
once the conversation sought had occurred. Further, there was
no provision for notice to the party under observation as is re-
quired by a conventional warrant, and there was no requirement
of a showing of special facts which would excuse this defect.
Nor was there any requirement of a return being made to the
court upon the warrant. In addition, the Court objected to the
two-month duration of the permitted eavesdropping, stating that
this was tantamount to authorizing a series of searches under
the same warrant with no new showing of probable cause. Simi-
48. The outcome is important because other states which have
adopted court procedures for electronic search and seizure have used
the New York act as a model. See MD. A N. CoDE art. 35, § 94
(1957); MAss. AN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1966); NEv. REy. STAT.
§ 200.660 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 141.720 (1963).
49. N.Y. CoDE CRnw. PRoc. § 813-a (1957).
50. Although the New York Act uses the words "reasonable
ground," both New York and federal cases have held that this phrase
is equivalent to "probable cause." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
313 (1959); People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup.
Ct. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 27 App. Div. 2d 572, 276 N.Y.S.2d
168 (1966).
19671
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larly, the renewal clause authorizing the judge to extend the
electronic surveillance if such was "in the public interest" was
held to be objectionable in that it did not seem to require a new
showing of probable cause.
The Court held that because of these defects, the statute
authorized a trespassory invasion of the home by general war-
rant, contrary to the command of the fourth amendment.51 It
was further stated that unless a warrant or statute authorizing
eavesdropping could be drawn in compliance with the amend-
ment, the fruits of eavesdropping devices were barred from the
courts.
In response to the contention that no such warrant or statute
is possible, the Court cited Osborn v. United States52 wherein
the Court upheld a conviction based upon recordings made under
a court order. In Osborn, two federal judges authorized the
placing of a device upon the person of a prospective witness.
The order was based upon an affidavit by the witness setting
forth previous conversations relating to the bribing of jurors in
a case then on trial. The Berger opinion pointed to the precise
and discriminate procedures by which the order in Osborn was
obtained and executed. The order for this permissible eaves-
dropping was limited to one conversation, and was required to
particularly describe the type of conversation which was to be
recorded. In addition, the officer was required to make a return
showing how the order had been executed and what had been
seized. By these safeguards the Court in Osborn felt that the
danger of an unreasonable search and seizure had been mini-
mized.
The Court was undoubtedly correct in holding that the New
York statute did not specifically comply with the traditional test
of fourth amendment safeguards. However, the decision to
apply these tests to strike down the Act, rather than to "graft"
these requirements onto the statute as Justice Harlan suggested
in his dissent,53 would seem based more on policy than law.
51. 388 U.S. at 64.
52. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
53. 388 U.S. at 89. Justice Harlan's position is based upon two
rules of statutory construction: first, that in construing state statutes
the Court must adopt the construction that the courts of that particular
state have given the act; and, second, that a statute should be declared
unconstitutional only if no possible constitutional construction can be
found therein. The New York cases had ruled that the standards of
the fourth amendment were applicable to the electronic search and
seizure order. Justice Harlan reasoned that the Act should be so con-
strued by the Supreme Court.
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CASE COMMENTS
There is the practical argument that electronic devices are of
great benefit in preventing crimes and gathering evidence against
the barons of organized crime.54 However, there are contrary
arguments that such devices are not compatible with the demo-
cratic ideal of the dignity of the individual, that eavesdropping
is a dirty business, 5 and that to permit such action will lead to
an Orwellian police state.56 The decision in the instant case
would seem to be weighted toward the "privacy side of these
two conflicting policies.157
In reaching this result, the Court applied the standards
which have been previously used to test searches and war-
rants for tangible objects, but by so doing the Court has se-
verely limited electronic search and seizure. The requirement
that both the nature of the crime allegedly committed and the
type of conversation sought must be specifically set forth means
that evidence and not merely information must be the object of
the search. In addition, the rule that an eavesdrop must cease
upon the seizure of the conversation sought increases the me-
chanical difficulties of eavesdropping since the Court would re-
quire that for any subsequent conversations a new warrant
showing probable cause be obtained. Finally, the Court's ob-
jection to the two-month authorization in the instant case and its
approval of the "dispatch" with which the search took place in
Osborn do not make clear what time limitation is to be regarded
as reasonable under the fourth amendment. It can be said with
certainty only that the reasonableness of the duration of the
electronic search will be determined on the facts of each case.58
54. See The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, A REPORT BY
THE PRESIDENT'S COIVInVIssIoN ONr LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINIS-
TRATION OP JUSTICE 200-03 (1967) (quoted extensively in White's dissent
in Berger); Donnelly, Electronic Eavesdropping, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW.
667 (1963); Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prose-
cutor's View, 44 1MNN. L. REV. 835 (1960).
55. The "dirty business" phrase has been popular with the various
judges and commentators who disapprove of the use of electronic de-
vices. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
56. See Greenwalt, Wiretapping and Bugging: Striking a Balance
Between Privacy and Law Enforcement, CASE & COMMV. Sept.-Oct.
1967, at 3; Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Pro-
fessor's View, 44 Mim. L. REV. 891 (1960); Williams, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 MINNu. L. REV.
855 (1960).
57. The various policy arguments in this area have not changed
basically since the Olmstead decision. See, e.g., 2 U. Cin. L. REV. 409
(1928); 77 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1928); 15 VA. L. REV. 63 (1928); 35 W. VA.
L. REv. 93 (1928).
58. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
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The Berger decision arguably establishes two new constitu-
tional requirements for a valid fourth amendment search and
seizure. These are the requirements of notice, or the reason for
the lack thereof, and of a return made on the warrant. Although
these elements have been previously embodied in statutes,,9 by
now applying them constitutionally to the use of listening de-
vices, the Court is attempting to provide complete protection for
the citizen from the serious invasion of privacy that eavesdrop-
ping constitutes. While requiring the police to make a return
on the warrant is an obvious safeguard, any giving of notice to a
party under surveillance would completely destroy the useful-
ness of electronic search and seizu=e. What the Court would
require as an excuse for lack of notice is not revealed. In light
of Osborn, it should be no more than a showing of the impor-
tance of the conversation involved and the fact that the desired
results could not be obtained if notice were given.
In applying the tangible object requirements to intangible
conversations, the Court has seemingly limited the use of listen-
ing devices to instances in which the police know almost exactly
when a conversation will take place, 60 who the parties will be,
and what they will talk about. The price of affording such pro-
tection to the right of privacy is the limitation of electronic
eavesdropping to corroboration rather than investigation.6 '
The Berger decision might be characterized as an open letter
to the states on the matter of electronic search and seizure re-
357 (1931). Since the warrant must specify a single conversation, it is
logical that the police would be able to listen to that entire conversation,
no matter how long it took and what variety of subjects were dis-
cussed. Arguably, however, if a conversation has gone on for one or
two hours without any mention of the topic for which the warrant was
issued, the police might have to cease their surveillance before the con-
versation was finished.
59. See, e.g., FED. R. Cam. P. 41(d) (both notice and return);
N.Y. CODE CRnW. PROC. § 802 (1957) (return).
60. The only cases in the electronic search and seizure area which
the Court seemed specifically to approve were Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); and
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). All of these are cases in
which the conversation was monitored with the aid of one of the parties
involved, enabling the police to manipulate the time of its occurrence.
Furthermore, since the Court's approval was limited to cases where one
party to the conversation had authorized its overhearing, the Court
may be implying that only in such situations is eavesdropping constitu-
tional. Compare notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
61. The majority in the Berger case contended that electronic eaves-
dropping was not, in fact, as helpful to law enforcement as its pro-
ponents argued. 388 U.S. at 60-62.
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